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Stephen L. Johnston (#1730) 
633 West 500 North 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
801-364-7320 
SUPREME COUNT, STATE OF UTAH 
FREED LEASING INC., 
Plaintiff/Respondent/ 
Cross Appellant, 
vs. 
DEBRA K. and EDWIN COMPTON, 
Defendants/Appellants/ 
Cross Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 87-0216 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appeal from Order of Honorable Rodney Page, District 
Judge for Davis County, awarding judgment to Debra and Edwin 
Compton in the sum of $758.99 each plus interest for a homestead 
exemption. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court for Davis County awarded judgment to 
Debra and Edwin Compton for $758.99 each plus interest for a 
homestead. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent asks this Court to rule: 
1. That the judgment for Edwin and Debra Compton for 
$758.99 each plus interest be reversed. 
2. That the District Court committed error in failing 
to award Respondent legal expenses. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On 23 April 1984, Plaintiff obtained judgment 
against Defendant Debra Compton in District Court for Salt Lake 
County for $7,387.40. 
2. On 29 June 1984, Debra Compton executed and re-
corded a quit claim deed of her interest in her residence in 
Davis County to her husband Edwin Compton. 
3. On 18 July 1984, Plaintiff docketed its judgment in 
Davis County. 
4. Plaintiff docketed its judgment pursuant to Section 
78-22-1 Utah Code. 
5. On/about 27 July 1984, Plaintiff filed suit in the 
District Court for Davis County to set aside the conveyance from 
Defendant Debra Compton to her husband Edwin Compton as being 
fraudulent. 
6. On 01 August 1984, Plaintiff recorded notice of its 
judgment lien against any interests in real property of Debra 
Compton in Davis County. 
7. On 01 August 1984, Defendant Debra Compton executed 
a warranty deed as attorney in fact for Edwin Compton conveying 
the subject property from Edwin Compton to Keith and Nona Jones. 
8. On/about 03 August 1984, Defendant Debra Compton, 
through counsel, contacted Plaintiff and indicated that Debra 
Compton desired to sell her property and that the judgment lien 
was an impediment to the sale. 
9. Defendant, in her negotiations, asserted that 
Plaintiff should remove the judgment lien "voluntarily" without 
payment of the judgment Plaintiff had against her. 
10. Following negotiations, an agreement was reached 
wherein Plaintiff was paid $1,517.98 toward Plaintiff's judgment 
of $7,387.40 in return for which Plaintiff filed a Partial Satis-
faction of Judgment and a Release of Lien. The agreement was 
that Plaintiff would release its judgment lien in consideration 
of payment of the $1,517.98. 
11. On/about 09 August 1984, Defendant Debra Compton 
filed a declaration of homestead on the subject property. The 
filing of the homestead was after the above transaction. 
12. On/about 10 August 1984, Defendant Debra Compton 
recorded a warranty deed to the subject property transferring it 
to Keith and Nona Jones. 
13. On/about 29 August 1984, Defendant filed suit 
against Plaintiff for slander of title. 
14. Respondent's research revealed additional points 
of law since filing its docketing statement. Respondent requests 
they be considered by the Court. 
POINTS RAISED ON APPEAL 
I 
THE RIGHT TO A JUDGMENT LIEN IS UNCONDITIONAL AND 
THE UNCONDITIONAL RIGHTS OF THE JUDGMENT LIENHOLD-
ER ARE NOT CHANGED BY THE FACT THAT THE JUDGMENT 
DEBTOR CLAIMS A HOMESTEAD. THE LIENHOLDER HAS A 
RIGHT TO CONTINUE ITS JUDGMENT LIEN EVEN THOUGH 
PRIOR LIENS AND THE HOMESTEAD AMOUNT EXCEEDS JUDG-
MENT DEBTORS1 EQUITY IN THE PROPERTY. THE HOME-
STEAD EXEMPTION ONLY APPLIES TO EXECUTIONS. RE-
SPONDENT DID NOT EXECUTE. THE TRANSACTION WAS 
PARTIAL PAYMENT OF A JUDGMENT IN RETURN FOR RE-
LEASE OF THE JUDGMENT LIEN AND OCCURRED BEFORE THE 
HOMESTEAD WAS DECLARED. 
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II 
THE 29 JUNE 1984 QUIT CLAIM DEED OF DEBRA COMPTON 
CONVEYED ALL OF HER INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY. THE 
DOCKETING AND RECORDING OF A JUDGMENT LIEN IN JULY 
OF 1984 WOULD ATTACH TO NO INTEREST OF DEBRA COMP-
TON, THEREFORE, THE SUBSEQUENT DOCKETING/RECORDING 
OF THE JUDGMENT LIEN WAS NO IMPEDIMENT TO THE 
TRANSFERABILITY OF DEBRA COMPTON'S INTEREST IN THE 
PROPERTY. 
Ill 
SINCE THE JUDGMENT LIENS ONLY APPLY TO UNEXEMPT 
PROPERTY INTEREST, THE LIEN WAS NOT AN IMPEDIMENT 
TO THE TRANSFERABILITY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
IV 
THE CLAIMED HOMESTEAD BY DEBRA COMPTON WAS INVALID. 
V 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO 
AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES TO APPELLANTS. THE DISTRICT 
COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES TO RE-
SPONDENT. 
VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN OFFSETTING DEBRA 
COMPTON1S JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT. 
I 
THE RIGHT TO A JUDGMENT LIEN IS UNCONDITIONAL AND 
THE UNCONDITIONAL RIGHTS OF THE JUDGMENT LIENHOLD-
ER ARE NOT CHANGED BY THE FACT THAT THE JUDGMENT 
DEBTOR CLAIMS A HOMESTEAD. THE LIENHOLDER HAS A 
RIGHT TO CONTINUE ITS JUDGMENT LIEN EVEN THOUGH 
PRIOR LIENS AND THE HOMESTEAD AMOUNT EXCEEDS JUDG-
MENT DEBTORS' EQUITY IN THE PROPERTY. THE HOME-
STEAD EXEMPTION ONLY APPLIES TO EXECUTIONS. RE-
SPONDENT DID NOT EXECUTE. THE TRANSACTION WAS 
PARTIAL PAYMENT OF A JUDGMENT IN RETURN FOR RE-
LEASE OF THE JUDGMENT LIEN AND OCCURRED BEFORE THE 
HOMESTEAD WAS DECLARED. 
The case of Taylor v. Jensen Brothers 641 P2d 150 (UT, 
1982), held that a judgment lien automatically becomes a lien on 
all unexempt real estate of the judgment debtor at the time it is 
docketed. It was held that the right to a judgment lien is un-
conditional and not subject to alteration by the Court. The 
Court held that the trial court's attempt to deny judgment lien 
to the judgment creditors was error. 
It follows that Plaintiff, in this case, had an uncon-
ditional right to its judgment lien and that Plaintiff could not 
be forced to remove it by Defendants' claim that Debra Compton 
was going to file a homestead exemption. 
In Belnap v. Blaine 575 P2d 696 (UT, 1978) Plaintiff 
sued to foreclose a judgment lien on property in which Defendant 
had an interest. The trial court added all encumbrances up and 
made a finding as to the market value. The market value was ex-
ceeded by the total of encumbrances. The trial court held that 
since the total amount of encumbrances exceeded the market value, 
the Debtor had no interest to which a judgment lien could attach. 
The Utah Supreme Court revised the ruling and held that 
liens do not constitute an estate that diminished the owner's 
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interest. The fee simple owner has an interest to which a judg-
ment could attach subject to the priority of prior encumbrances. 
Applying the reasoning of the Belnap v. Blaine and Tay-
lor v, Jensen to this case since the judgment creditor has an ab-
solute right to a judgment lien and since the encumbrances do not 
constitute an estate that diminish the owner's interest, even if 
the quit claim deed of Debra Compton is ignored, she had an in-
terest to which a judgment could attach subject to the priority 
of the prior encumbrances and which need not be removed because 
of threats on actual establishment of a homestead. 
In the case of Grey v. Stevens 302 P2d 237 (UT, 1956) 
the judgment debtor sued to quiet title in property upon which he 
had declared a homestead. Defendant, the judgment creditor, had 
held an execution on Plaintiff's property but the bids were not 
sufficient. 
The trial court added the mortgages to the homestead 
and subtracted this amount from the value of the property. The 
result was a negative amount. 
The trial court ruled that the judgment debtor was pre-
vented from having a lien on the property. 
The Utah Supreme Court overturned the decision. The 
Supreme Court said that the homestead amount was invulnerable to 
attack by the judgment creditor. During the life of the judg-
ment, the judgment creditor has a lien on unexempt property of 
the debtor. The Court said that the only prerequisite success-
fully to levy execution on a homestead burdened property is a bid 
in excess of the homestead. The homestead amount is paid to the 
homesteader, the balance is paid to the judgment creditor. 
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and quieted 
title in the judgment debtor to the extent of the homestead only. 
The Supreme Court stated: 
"So long as the judgment is extant, allbeit impotent in 
an attack on the homestead, the judgment doesn't lack 
virility in (the future) when the property may be dis-
encumbered ." (Emphas is added.) 
It is clear that the homestead statute is a protection 
from execution. It is also clear that since the judgment lien is 
an absolute right given by statute and can't be modified by court 
order, it can't be modified by threats of or actual assertion of 
a homesteaa. 
Plaintiff had an absolute right to its judgment lien 
and to continue the judgment lien until legally removed Freeman 
v, Wintroath Pumps (AZ) 475 P2d 274. 
The homestead could force Plaintiff to pay in the home-
stead amount if it sought to execute on the property, which it 
did not. Grey v. Stevens supra. 
Belnap v. Blaine held that even though the amount of 
the encumbrances exceed the value of the property, the judgment 
debtor still had an interest in the property to which a judgment 
lien attaches. The judgment creditor has an unconditional right 
to a judgment lien not subject to alteration. Taylor v. Jensen 
Brothers 641 P2d 150 (1982). 
Freeman v. Wintroath Pumps held that a judgment lien 
gives the judgment creditor no estate of any kind in land. It 
merely gives the judgment creditor the right to levy on the land 
to satisfy the judgment to the exclusion of subsequent lien hold-
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ers. The debtor has the full power to sell or otherwise dispose 
of the land subject to the judgment lien. 
Kinny v. Valentine (Cal) 541 P2d 537 holds that a 
judgment creditor is entitled to the increases in equity which 
take place after the judgment debtor transfers the property. 
Freeman v. Wintroath Pumps (supra) held that once a 
judgment lien attaches to land, it remains until legally removed. 
A judgment debtors purchaser who has actual constructive notice 
takes the property subject to the judgment lien. 
The case cited by Appellant of Sanders v. Cassity 536 
P2d 423 (UT, 1978) is not applicable to this case. That case 
simply held that a homestead is immune from execution sale if the 
declaration (giving the sheriff notice/recording the selection) 
is done prior to the time of the execution sale. 
In that case, the judgment creditor argued that the 
judgment debtor must record the homestead prior to the entry of 
the judgment lien. 
The case of Grand Real Estate v. Serignario (AZ 1983) 
676 P2d 642 held that a judgment lien doesn't extend to property 
concerning to which a homestead declaration has been filed. 
Evans v. Young 661 P2d 1148 (AZ 1983) held that if the 
value of the homestead property exceeds the homestead and encum-
brances, the execution sale proceeds will go first to the debtor 
in the amount of the homestead exemption, second to satisfy the 
judgment creditor if the value of the debtors property exceeds 
the value of the homestead exemption and encumbrances and the 
property can be divided. Part of the property worth the value of 
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the exemption and liens will be set aside and the remainder will 
be sold to satisfy the judgment. 
The case of State v. Smith (AZ App 1981) 628 P2d 65 
held that a homestead right may be waived by simple failure to 
assert the claim prior to execution. 
The case of Christensen v. Christgard 668 P2d 1301 
(Wash App 1983) held that a judgment lien on the debtor's proper-
ty is subject to the debtor's right to defeat an execution sale 
by the filing of a homestead declaration. 
The Utah case of Gilroy v. Lowe (UT, 1981) 626 P2d 469 
held that a sheriff is not prohibited from carrying out an execu-
tion sale where defendants filed and served the homestead exemp-
tion prior to the sale because the defendant's equity in the home 
exceeded the homestead exemption and the bidder of the sale paid 
in the amount of the homestead to the sheriff prior to the sale. 
In this case, the fact that the title company would not 
proceed with the transaction until the lien was released is a 
matter between the title company and appellants. 
II 
THE 29 JUNE 1984 QUIT CLAIM DEED OF DEBRA COMPTON 
CONVEYED ALL OF HER INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY. THE 
DOCKETING AND RECORDING OF A JUDGMENT LIEN IN JULY 
OF 1984 WOULD ATTACH TO NO INTEREST OF DEBRA COMP-
TON, THEREFORE, THE SUBSEQUENT DOCKETING/RECORDING 
OF THE JUDGMENT LIEN WAS NO IMPEDIMENT TO THE 
TRANSFERABILITY OF DEBRA COMPTON'S INTEREST IN THE 
PROPERTY. 
Plaintiff docketed its judgment pursuant to 78-22-1 
Utah Code. It states: 
"From the time a judgment is docketed and filed with 
the clerk of the court, it becomes a lien on all real 
property of the judgment debtor ... not exempt from 
execution." (Emphasis added.) 
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Belnap v. Blaine 575 P2d 696 (UT, 1978) held that a 
lien of judgment does not attach to naked legal title but at-
taches it to the judgment debtors' interest in the real estate. 
If he has no interest, no lien attaches. Therefore, Debra 
Compton1s interest passed by her quit claim transfer and there 
was nothing to which the judgment lien could attach. The trans-
fer was a valid transfer until declared invalid by Judge Page in 
April 1987. 
Since the judgment lien by its own terms applied only 
to interests in real property of the judgment debtor and since 
Debra Compton had previously conveyed her interest in the real 
property, there was nothing to which the judgment lien could at-
tach and therefore no impediment resulted to the transferability 
of Debra Compton's interest. 
Ill 
SINCE THE JUDGMENT LIENS ONLY APPLY TO UNEXEMPT 
PROPERTY INTEREST, THE LIEN WAS NOT AN IMPEDIMENT 
TO THE TRANSFERABILITY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
Section 78-22-1, provides that from the time a judgment 
is docketed and filed, it becomes a lien on real property of the 
judgment debtor not exempt from execution. The judgment lien was 
not an impediment to the marketability of Debra Compton1s inter-
est because the judgment lien only applied to that portion of her 
interest which was unexempt. 
a. The judgment lien did not affect Edwin Compton!s 
interest in the subject property. 
By its terms, the judgment lien only applied to Debra 
Compton1s interest. Edwin Compton was named a party in Respon-
dent fs lawsuit to set aside the conveyance of 29 June 1984 by 
Debra Compton to her husband Edwin Compton as being fraudulent• 
Edwin Comptonfs property interest was totally unaffected by the 
docketing and recording of a judgment lien as against he inter-
ests of Debra Compton. 
IV 
THE CLAIMED HOMESTEAD BY DEBRA COMPTON WAS INVALID. 
On 01 August 1984, Edwin Compton executed a warranty 
deed conveying the subject property to Keith and Nona Jones. The 
deed was delivered to escrow. The execution and delivery of the 
deed is binding on all parties having actual notice, pursuant to 
57-1-6 Utah Code Annotated. Debra Compton had notice because she 
executed the deed as attorney in fact for Edwin Compton. 
Since the execution and delivery of the deed on 01 Au-
gust 1984 was before the claim of homestead on 09 August 1984, 
the claim of homestead by Debra Compton is a nullity because both 
Debra Compton and her husband were bound by the warranty deed of 
01 August 1987. 
V 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO 
AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES TO APPELLANTS. THE DISTRICT 
COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES TO RE-
SPONDENT. 
Appellants have insisted throughout that the deed from 
Debra Compton to her husband Edwin Compton was valid. (See Debra 
Comptonfs Affidavit, page 4; Defendant Memorandum, page 2; Answer 
and Counterclaim, first cause of action, paragraphs 3 and 4.) 
Respondent has acted in good faith throughout these procedings. 
Appellants were found to have made a fraudulent conveyance which 
was for the purpose of defrauding Respondent. Respondent had no 
obligation to remove a judgment lien which the law grants them. 
Chapter 23 of Title 78 applies to execution on proper-
ties . Respondent did not execute on the property and therefore 
Appellants are not entitled to attorneys fees under Section 78-
23-13 Utah Code Annotated. 
The case of Cady v. Johnson (UT) 671 P2d 149, held that 
even though an action has no basis in law or fact or is without 
merit, it is in good faith if there is an honest belief that it is 
appropriate. The trial court specifically found that the deed was 
fraudulent. Plaintiff had every right to file and pursue the case. 
There is no evidence of bad faith on the part of Re-
spondent . 
Appellants are guilty of bad faith and fraud in exe-
cuting and recording a fraudulent transfer from Debra Compton to 
her husband to avoid a judgment. The District Court was correct 
in denying Appellants1 legal expenses. 
The District Court made an error in not awarding Re-
spondent legal expenses. Defendants acted in bad faith in making 
a fraudulent conveyance. Plaintiff had to pursue its remedy in 
court and litigate to have the deed declared fraudulent. Plain-
tiff was successful and should be awarded attorneys fees. 
VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN OFFSETTING DEBRA 
COMPTON1S JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT. 
Rule 62 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the 
offset. Respondent has an unpaid judgment against Debra Compton 
of $7387.40. It would be unjust to allow Debra Compton to col-
lect $800.00 for Respondent when Respondent has an unpaid judg-
ment against Debra Compton for $7387.40. 
SUMMARY 
1. The judgment awarded to Debra and Edwin Compton 
each in the sum of $758.99 plus interest should be reversed. 
2. The ruling of the District Court in denying Respon-
dent attorneys fees should be reversed. 
3. The ruling of the District Court should be affirmed 
in all other respects. 
Dated this /^J day of August 1987. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was mailed to the Supreme Court (10 copies), 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, Benson Mabey (2 copies), 
Attorney, 376 East 400 South #300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
Freed Leasing, 525 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112, 
(3-FC), dated this jH day of August 1987. 
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